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Abstract: 
 The attacks on computer networks and computer 
systems are increasingly becoming numerous and 
sophisticated in nature. Hence this has given a growing 
need for intrusion detection systems to identify these 
attacks. The use of these intrusion detection systems 
have given rise to another problem, the handling, and 
the presentation of large amounts of alerts generated by 
these systems. In this paper we introduce a layered 
framework for network intrusion analysis and use a 
clustered visualization technique to group and visualize 
large amounts of alerts, and other network nodes based 
on their similarities. This layered clustering 
visualization allows users to visually explore and 
analyze the intrusion data. The cross-navigation 
between layers is achieved by user’s interaction. This 
allows users to actively display the groups and 




Information visualization; clustered visualization; data 
clustering; Intrusion Detection Systems; Interactive 
visualization 
1. Introduction 
The traditional computer security efforts mainly have 
been aimed at rendering computer networks invulnerable to 
attacks by employing tools such as firewalls, and Intrusion 
Detection Systems. The organizations rely on Intrusion 
detection analysts to monitor output from intrusion 
detection systems. These analysts use IDS output 
complemented by other system, firewall, and network logs 
to carry out their analysis work. These logs can grow 
enormously in size containing huge amount of textual 
information, and hence making manual review impossible. 
 These causes lots of attacks to go unnoticed and are 
not detected as mentioned by global security survey (2003). 
Even though the IDSS identify potential intrusive alerts, 
however due to the complicated nature of detecting actual 
intrusions, most current IDSS place the job of 
distinguishing an actual alert from a set of large alerts on 
the IDS analyst, causing a significant cognitive load from 
an analyst. This cognitive load can be reduced by the use of 
information visualization by taking advantage of human 
perceptual abilities to increase cognition as talked by 




Figure 1: The main intrusion detection research areas 
 
Figure 1 shows the main research areas in intrusion 
detection. As can be seen from the diagram they are data 
collection, data detection, reporting, and Intrusion detection 
system security. The data collection area is about defining 
what data to be collected as an input to the detection system. 
It raises research questions such as mechanisms for 
collecting data. How the data will be stored. The collection 
points in the network for the data as well as logging of the 












security research involves protecting various different 
components of the IDS against attacks especially the 
protection of data storage, and data collection points. The 
data detection and evaluation research concentrates on 
finding optimal algorithms to distinguish abnormal network 
data from network traffic. The reporting research is 
concerned with finding the best way to display the detected 
intrusion alerts to bring to the attention of the system 
administrator the series of events that are suspicious.  
This paper concentrates on the reporting aspects of 
IDS. Next we discuss the related research in the area 
followed by our technique of layered approach to intrusion 
analysis, and clustering visualization to improve the way 
the intrusive data is displayed for visualization purposes. 
We then discuss advantages of using our approach followed 
by a conclusion and future work. 
2. Related research 
There are several visualization tools available that 
employ various visualization techniques to display intrusive 
network traffic. The work by Girardin and Brodbeck (1998) 
describes the combination of machine learning and 
visualization to provide automatic classification of firewall 
generated network events to facilitate network profiling and 
log analysis. The work carried out by Erabacher (2002) 
shows a two dimensional glyph based visual overview of a 
single host and a related network to represent intrusion 
detection visualization. Similarly a tool like NIVA as 
mentioned by Nyarko, and Capers (2002) uses the input 
from existing IDS sensors to interactively display that data 
using glyphs in three dimensional space. The paper by 
Solka (2002) uses statistical visualization methods such as 
parallel coordinate plots and circle plots to display the 
network data collected from existing IDSs.   
However none of these techniques discuss the use of 
clustering to display related alert data in the form of 
clusters to display direct relationship between alerts, 
attacking hosts, and effected nodes. Our technique uses 
clustered visualization integrated with real-time 
visualization to visually display intrusive activities. The 
real-time visualization is enabled by using real-time visual 
querying. 
The clustered visualization is a new type of the 
information visualization techniques, such as DA-TU 
developed by Eades and Huang (2000) and Node Grouping 
proposed by Six and Tollis (2001) that can be used to deal 
with the large scale visualization problem. In clustered 
visualization, related nodes are grouped in “clusters” or 
super-nodes and then are drawn in a geometric plant for 
visualization. The user sees a “summary” of the graph: the 
super-nodes and super-edges between the super-nodes. 
Some clusters may be shown in more detail than others.    
The increase use of very high-speed lines has caused 
collected network data to become very large in volume. As 
a result the amount of data the security analyst must cope 
with is increasing in size. The grouping of alert data such 
that the data within a single cluster have similar 
characteristics, while points in different clusters are 
dissimilar can allow more effective visualization of large 
amount of alerts by allowing the security analyst to predict 
attack patterns. For instance, one cluster may consist of 
ping sweep attack, while other consisting of TCP port scan 
attack. The clusters can then be used to characterize the 
occurrence of different attacks in the form of alerts. These 
characterizations can then be used to derive targeting 
attackers such that specific attackers are directing their 
attacks towards specific group of hosts or a single host. 
This mapping of attackers to effected nodes can be used to 
conclude for instance target hosts for attacker A, and target 
nodes for attacker B. By further using real-time 
visualization to display exchanged dialogue between 
attacking node, and effected hosts, the security analyst can 
predict future behavior of a particular attacking host, based 
on their existing behavior. Next we discuss in more detail 
on how our approach works. 
3. Our approach 
We use a layered approach to analyze network 
intrusion data to facilitate both monitoring, and analysis 
phase of intrusion detection. Figure 2 shows our layered 
architecture for intrusion detection analysis. The layered 
approach to intrusion detection will allow monitoring of all 
attack alerts and will be used to identify potentially 
suspicious alerts. It will reduce cognitive load on security 
analysts in analyzing alert data, and analyzing other related 
data such as effected network nodes and attacking hosts to 
diagnose attacks.  
  
 









The layered approach to intrusion detection and 
analysis will provide an interactive monitoring of attacks 
through implicit relationship between layers described 
above. The first phase of intrusion detection is the 
surveillance of the network infrastructure and available 
network resources as mentioned by Koziol (2003). This 
task involves monitoring of IDS generated output. Our 
layered approach will provide the surveillance of the 
network infrastructure and available network resources. 
Next we discuss each layer. The transition from each layer 
will allow both the monitoring and analysis of intrusion 
detections. 
3.1. The activity layer 
The activity layer can provide the monitoring 
functionality in the form of 2D displays of alerts according 
to alert type. It will allow grouping of alerts based on 
common alert properties as shown in table 2. The grouping 
of alerts is discussed in the next section. The activity layer 
display of alerts will allow for continuous monitoring 
without the need for focused attention. The layer can 
provide the starting point for recognizing and flagging 
events that require further investigation.  
3.2. The external layer 
The external layer will provide clusters of attacking 
nodes according to displayed alerts by the activity layer. 
The clustering will be derived based on attributes of the 
nodes given in table 1. The section 4 of the paper discusses 
the grouping technique. This layer will relate the generated 
alerts to the attacking hosts and will provide overview 
display. The external layer will serve the purpose of 
displaying an overview of the current intrusion activity in 
the form of attacking node clusters derived from grouped 
alerts in the activity layer. Each attacking node group will 
correspond to the alert type displayed in the activity layer. 
The combination of activity and external layer will provide 
a big picture by relating alerts and attacking nodes.                     
3.3. The internal layer 
The internal layer will provide a group of internal 
nodes affected by a particular node selected from external 
layer cluster. The attributes given in table 1 will be used to 
construct internal layer node clusters. This layer will allow 
further analysis of traffic between an attacking node and 
internal network node. The analysis will be achieved by the 
individual layer.  
3.4. The individual layer 
The individual layer will be used to allow real-time 
visualization of suspected dialogue between attacker and 
residential node by enabling real-time visual query system.  
At each layer excluding the individual layer the links 
between clusters will be formed using a force model as 
described by Eades and Huang (2000).  The links at 
activity layer between the alerts will also be formed by 
using a force model discussed further in the paper. Next we 
discuss in more depth on how our technique of grouping 
alerts and nodes will work. The next section discusses how 
we will form cluster of similar alerts and nodes for 
visualization.  
4. The grouping of alerts and nodes 
The set of information associated with alerts and nodes 
(network devices) are called their properties. In this section 
we discuss the most common properties of both alerts and 
nodes. The grouping of nodes and alerts are based on the 
similarities of these properties.  
4.1. The properties of alerts and nodes 
The table 1 below shows the node attributes that can 
be used for grouping nodes together to form clusters of 
nodes. Similarly table 2 below shows the alert attributes in 
relation to grouping of alerts to derive clustered 
visualization.   
4.2. Similarity rules 
The alerts can be grouped together based on some 
similarity rules. We define our similarity rules based on 
considering that IDS generated alerts consists of several 
attributes such as destination and source IP addresses etc as 
shown in table 1. We can consider alerts to be a set 
{A1…An} and attributes to be as a set {P1 … Pn}. We can 
use this technique to derive common relationships based on 
using the common properties of the alerts.  We can derive 
grouping of alerts based on using say an attribute P1 for 
both alert A1 and A2. Similarly we can derive subsets of the 
attribute set such as {P1…P9} and can use the subset to 
derive alert groups. We can further group large amount of 
alerts together by based on particular attribute’s value 
ranges. For instance using the destination ip address of an 
alert, we can derive a subnet and group alerts according to 
the subnet value.  
This can be further illustrated by an example. If there 
are alerts A1, A2, A3, and A4, with destination addresses as 
  
192.168.0.1, 192.168.0.2, 192.168.0.3, and 192.168.0.4 
consecutively. We can use this information to derive a 
subnet for these ip addresses and then group alerts 
according to the subnet value. In this case a subnet can be 
192.168.0.0.  By using the same approach, we can also 
derive node clusters. For example we can consider nodes to 
be a set {N1…Nn} with attributes as {P1…Pn}. Again we 
can produce subset such as {P1…P3} or {P1} to derive 
grouping of nodes based on their attributes as show in 
table2. For instance the port ranges on the nodes can be 
used to derive grouped nodes. Let us consider alerts 
generated by the TCP-Scan. The TCP-Scan can be used to 
determine if the targeted system is windows. The intruder 
can obtain this knowledge about the targeted host by 
performing TCP-Scan and by observing that a NetBios 
session running on port 139 is open, this information is the 
characteristic of windows system.  The nodes can be 
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IP header length 
IP datagram length 
Window Size 
Time to live 
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IP flag 
Reset flag 1 




Syn packet flag 
Fin flag 
Data Urgent Pointer 
Ack number 
Sequence number 
Length of data in    
segment 
 
Table2. The table shows the list of attributes for a 
typical alert. 
 
4.3. Moving across different layers 
In this section we discuss how to navigate between 
each intrusion detection layer visually using interactive 
visualization. The word interactive visualization is often 
used in different contexts. However in the purpose of our 
work, we will use it in terms of navigation, and animated 
transitions. The navigation consists of changing either the 
viewpoint or the position of an object in a scene. The 
animated transitions as shown in figure 3 allow viewers to 
have a much easier time retaining their mental model of an 
object if changes to its structure or its position are shown as 
smooth transitions instead of discreet jumps [7]. The 
security analyst can visualize the alerts at the activity layer 
in the form of grouped alerts. They will be able to see 
similar alerts according to similarity rules explained in 
section 4.2 in same clusters.  As shown in figure 3 by 
using interactive visualization, they will be able to move 
from alerts clusters to clusters consisting of attacking nodes 
affecting the internal hosts as shown in the figure (External 
layer). They can then get further insights by interactively 
moving into 3r layer (Internal layer) containing internal 
nodes affected by particular external nodes.  The transition 
from 3rd layer to 4th layer (individual layer) as shown in 
figure 2 will allow real time visualization and will display 
the connection requests as lines as shown in the figure 3.   
The real time visualization environment will create 
visual representation of the network nodes (internal and 
external) as glyphs shown in Figure 4.  The glyphs will 
incorporate visual attributes related to network nodes such 
as number of users, system load, status, and unusual or 
unexpected activity. The visual attributes will be easily 
interpretable for their actual meaning as described by   
Shneiderman (1996). For instance initial connection request 
from an attacking host will be represented as a single line as 
shown in Figure 4b. After connection has been established 
the single line will be replaced by a line indicating type of 
connection that has been established as shown in Figure 4 
(d,e,f,g,h). The arrows in the lines contain the direction of 
the connection. The lines containing no arrows will 
represent unsuccessful connection attempts for different 
connection types as shown in Figure 3b.  
The nodes and the lines will remain active until the 
user will terminate the session, at which point the node and 
lines will degrade and fade. The degradation will provide 
temporal relationships and assistance in making events 
more persistent. As many events, such as port scans, are 
instantaneous, it’s important to ensure that events exist on 
screen for a sufficient duration. 
The Figure 4 shows different connection types as lines. 
Figure 4d shows telnet and rlogin connections as solid lines. 
  
The Figure 4e shows ftp sessions as dashed lines. The 
figure 4f indicates accessing NFS (Network file System). 
The figure 4g indicates suspicious connections without 
known connection type. The figure 4h shows the 
representation of a port scan. The figure4a represents 
number of incoming connections from an external node to a 
local host. The inner rings define the system load. The 
figure 4b represents the initial connection requests.  The 
figure 4c indicates connections initiated by the external 




Figure3: The figure shows interactive visualization to move 





Figure4: The figure above shows the basic glyph 
organization for the real time visualization. 
 
Next section discusses how we visually represent these 
graphically clustered nodes. 
5. Clustered visualization 
Once all nodes in the top three layers are grouped into 
clusters, we will use clustered visualization technique to 
visually present these clusters. Our visualization technique 
will allow users to interactively manipulate data in four 
levels of visual structures, including graph level, clustering 
level, abridgement level, and finally picture level. Next we 
discuss each of these visualization levels.  
5.1. The graph level 
In our visualization we use a graph model to represent 
alerts and other network related entities. A graph in our 
visualization is a classical undirected graph, consisting of 
nodes and edges. In our application it is likely a very large 
graph, containing hundreds or thousands of network entities 
and alerts. The graph may be dynamic, that is, the node and 
edge set may be changing; these changes may be a result of 
user interaction through the visualization, or they may be 
changed asynchronously by an outside agent. 
5.2. The clustering level 
Our visualization will use clusters to represent set of 
groups of nodes and alerts based on variety of similarity 
rules as defined above. The use of clustered visualization 
will significantly reduce a visual complexity of displaying 
large amounts of network related data. A clustered graph C 
= (G, T) consists of an undirected graph G = (V, E) and a 
rooted tree T such that the leaves of T are exactly the 
vertices of G as mentioned in a paper by Eades and Huang 
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visualization can operate on a clustered graph C= (G, T) by 
two basic operations, create and destroy a cluster. Both can 
be performed by user interaction, or by an algorithm 




Figure5: A clustered visualization consists of ten 
clusters. 
5.3. The abridgement level 
The current Intrusion Detection systems lack in 
display focus. They do not consider user orientations and 
focuses of large amounts of data. The use of abridgement 
level in our visualization provides users with a 
focus+context viewing mechanism for navigating the large 
cluster tree. In many cases, the whole clustered graph is too 
large to show on the screen; further, it is too large for the 
user to comprehend. In our implementation, the clustered 
visualization draws only an ``abridgement'' of the entire 
clustered graph at a time. 
We now give a formal definition of ``abridgement''. 
Suppose that U is a set of nodes of the cluster tree T. The 
sub-tree of T consisting of all nodes and edges on paths 
between elements of U and the root is called the ancestor 
tree of U. A clustered graph C' = (G’, T') is an abridgement 
of the clustered graph C = (G, T) if T' is an ancestor tree of 
T with respect to a set U of nodes of T and there is an edge 
between two distinct nodes u and v of G' if and only if there 
is an edge in G between a descendent of u and a descendent 
of v. Our visualization has two elementary operations on 
abridgements; these change the basis of the abridgement. 
They are open a cluster and close a cluster. 
5.4. The picture level 
The picture level is concerned with the geometric 
position of the clustered graphs and its associated clustered 
trees as well as visual attributes to be associated to each 
displayed entity. Picture level of a clustered graph is shown 
in Figures 5. More formally, a picture of a clustered graph 
C = (G, T) contains a location p(v) for each vertex v of G 
and a route c(u, v) for each edge (u, v) of G, in the same 
way as drawings for classical graphs. Further, a picture has 
a region b(v) of the plane for each cluster v of T, such that if 
u is a leaf of T then b(v) is located at p(v), and if u is a child 
of v in T then b(u) is contained in b(v). The regions 
currently used by our visualization are rectangles. 
 Our visualization provides the usual operation of 
manually moving nodes in a picture. However, the main 
role of our visualization is animated automatic layout. 
5.5. The force model 
We use force-directed algorithm to draw the pictures 
of clustered graphs. It is based on the OFDAV force model 
described by Eades and Huang (2000). Our visualization 
has three types of spring forces: 
 
• Internal-spring- A spring force between a pair of 
vertices in the same cluster.    
• External-spring- A spring force between a pair of 
vertices in different clusters. 
• Virtual-spring- A spring force between a vertex 
and a virtual (dummy) node along a virtual 
(dummy) edge. 
 
As well as spring forces, between each pair of nodes there 
is a gravitational repulsion force. The forces are applied 
additively to give an aesthetically pleasing layout of the 
graph. The sum of forces on each node is continually 
computed, and the movement of the nodes according to the 
forces drives the animation, as with the visualization. 
5.6. Animations 
In our implementation, the whole visualization is fully 
animated. Every transition, whether triggered by the user, 
visualization, or by another agent, has its own specific 
animation. This greatly reduces the cognitive effort of the 
user in recognizing the new view and change; we aim for a 
  
full preservation of the user's ``mental map''. More 
specifically, there are eight types of animation that are 
implemented in our system. Five of these are specifically 
related to the clustering. 
6. Conclusions 
The current information visualization tools used for 
intrusion detection concentrate on the monitoring phase of 
intrusion detection with only limited support for analysis. 
They do not provide any solution to the large scale 
visualization problem. Our approach will allow the 
exploration of large amount of intrusion data in the form of 
clustered visualization and will support the entire process of 
detecting intrusions and follow up analysis activities to drill 
down and examine the attack activity in four separate layers 
with more detail. The visualization on each layer will 
provide users with different view of the network attacks.      
7. Future work 
We are currently developing our initial prototype to 
prove the concepts and our visualization technique. This 
will be used as a platform for further work. We will further 
conduct usability study to determine further improvements 
of the initial prototype that will address the current 
limitations in intrusion detection monitoring and analysis 
tools. 
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